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Wang William
A CAUSE OF ACTION FOR OPTION TRADERS AGAINST
INSIDER OPTION TRADERS
William K.S. Wang*
A recent Note in this Review argued that a cause of action should
be available under rule iob-51 for traders of options on corporate
stock against insider traders of options on the same stock.2 Surpris-
ingly, the Note ignored the fact that Congress has already approved
such an action in section 2o(d) of the Insider Trading Sanctions Act
of 1984. 3  The Note acknowledged that "section 2o(d) ... ma[de]
insider trading or tipping in stock options unlawful to the same extent
as trading or tipping in the underlying security," but the author er-
roneously concluded that "[t]his provision applies only to SEC enforce-
ment suits." 4
The Note's restrictive interpretation is plainly wrong. Section 2o(d)
provides:
Wherever communicating, or purchasing or selling a security while
in possession of, material nonpublic information would violate, or
result in liability to any purchaser or seller of the security under any
provision of this chapter, or any rule or regulation thereunder, such
conduct in connection with a purchase or sale of a put, call, straddle,
option, or privilege with respect to such security or with respect to a
group or index of securities including such security, shall also violate
and result in comparable liability to any purchaser or seller of that
security under such provision, rule, or regulation.
5
Professor of Law, University of California, Hastings College of Law.
17 C.F.R. § 240.Iob-5 (1987). Rule iob-5 was adopted pursuant to § io(b) of the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934. 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (1982).
2 See Note, Private Causes of Action for Option Investors Under SEC Rule sob-5: A Policy,
Doctrinal, and Economic Analysis, Ioo HARv. L. REv. 1959 (1987). In addition, the Note
argued that options traders should be allowed to sue insider traders of stock and to sue
corporations whose misstatements affect stock and option prices. See id. at 1964, 1967, 1973,
1976-78.
The issue whether an options trader can sue an insider options trader is distinct from the
issue whether an options trader can sue an insider stock trader. Courts are divided on the latter
question. Compare Laventhall v. General Dynamics Corp., 704 F.2d 407 (8th Cir.), cert. denied,
464 U.S. 846 (1983) (not allowing suit) and Starkman v. Warner Communications, Inc., 671 F.
Supp. 297, 301-07 (S.D.N.Y. 1987) (same) with Backman v. Polaroid Corp., 54o F. Supp. 667,
671 (D. Mass. 1982) (allowing standing to sue an insider stock trader but not deciding whether
the plaintiff could establish damage).
3 Pub. L. No. 98-376, 98 Stat. 1265 (1984) (codified as amended at i5 U.S.C. § 78t(d) (Supp.
11I 1985)).
4 Note, supra note 2, at 1962 (footnote omitted).
5 IS U.S.C. § 78t(d) (Supp. III r985) (emphasis added). Section 2o(d) closed a possible
loophole in rule iob-5 insider trading liability created by Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S.
222 (i98o). Chiarella emphasized as a basis for insider trading liability a relationship of "trust
1056
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Although the reference to "comparable liability" leaves open important
questions concerning the extent of the plaintiff class 6 and the nature
of the remedy, the last clause of this provision unambiguously refers
to private causes of action.
The clause is ambiguous, however, in its reference to "that secu-
rity." The phrase could mean either the underlying security (for ex-
ample, the common stock) or the derivative security (for example, the
option). 7 Under the first interpretation, Congress authorized a private
cause of action against insider option traders only for plaintiffs who
had traded the underlying stock. Under the second interpretation,
Congress authorized a private cause of action against insider option
traders only for plaintiffs who had traded the equivalent option.8
Only the second interpretation makes sense. Congress could not
have intended to exclude the person on the other side of the trade
from the class of "purchaser[s] or seller[s] of that security" authorized
to act as plaintiffs. The legislative history of the Insider Trading
Sanctions Act makes clear that the troublesome phrase "that security"
refers to the derivative security. In 1984, Senator Alfonse D'Amato
was chair of the Subcommittee on Securities of the Senate Committee
on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs. When the Insider Trading
Sanctions Act was introduced on the Senate floor, Senator D'Amato's
remarks in support of the bill included the following illustration of
the effect of section 2o(d):
and confidence" between the parties to the insider trade. Id. at 230-33. For a discussion
of Chiarella's "special relationship" theory, see Wang, Trading on Material Nonpublic Informa-
tion on Impersonal Stock Markets: Who is Harmed, and Who Can Sue Whom Under SEC Rule
rob-5?, 54 S. CAL. L. REv. 1217, 1269-71, 1285--94 (198i). An insider trader of options may
not have such a relationship of "trust and confidence" to the party on the other side of the
transaction. See id. at 1286-87; cf. Laventhall, 704 F.2d at 411-12 (finding no relationship of
trust and confidence between a plaintiff options trader and a defendant insider trader of the
underlying stock).
In its Supreme Court brief, the United States advanced an alternative theory to justify
Chiarella's conviction. The brief argued that, by trading, Chiarella, whose direct employer was
a financial printer preparing takeover announcements, breached his duty to his indirect em-
ployers, the acquiring corporations. See Chiarella, 445 U.S. at 235. The Court did not rule on
the validity of this "misappropriation theory" because it had not been submitted to the jury.
See id. at 235-36. See generally Wang, supra, at 1271-74, 1294-97 (discussing the iob-5
.misappropriation theory"); infra note 13 (discussing the theory's use by private plaintiffs). In
Carpenter v. United States, io8 S. Ct. 316 (1987), an evenly divided Supreme Court upheld
criminal convictions under § io(b) and rule lob-5 based on the "misappropriation theory," but
the opinion dealt only with the defendants' concurrent mall and wire fraud convictions (which
the Court upheld unanimously). The four Justices who voted to reverse the convictions under
§ Io(b) and rule iob-5 gave neither their reasons nor their names. See id. at 320.
6 See infra notes 12-13.
7 For a more detailed analysis of this ambiguity in section 2o(d), see Wang, The "Contem-
poraneous" Traders Who Can Sue an Inside Trader, 38 HASTINGS L.J. 1175, I88-9I (1987).
8 Apparently, no reported case has interpreted § 2o(d) since the Insider Trading Sanctions
Act's enactment in August 1984.
1988] 1057
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For example, if, in a given set of circumstances, a corporate officer
would violate the antifraud provisions by purchasing any securities
issued by his employer, subjecting himself to liability to selling share-
holders, then he would violate the antifraud provisions to the same
extent by purchasing options with respect to these securities, and
subject himself to comparable liability to selling option holders and
other similarly situated persons in the derivative market.9
The Senate added section 2o(d) to a bill passed by the House. 10
In 1984, Congressman John Dingell was chair of the House Committee
on Energy and Commerce. When Congressman Dingell introduced
the final version of the Insider Trading Sanctions Act on the floor of
the House, he inserted in the Congressional Record an explanation of
various Senate amendments and included (verbatim) the same example
quoted above. "'
Both the language of section 2o(d) and its legislative history indi-
cate that Congress presumed that at least some private stock-trading
plaintiffs had an implied cause of action against certain insider traders
of publicly traded stock. Although the Supreme Court has never
directly addressed this issue, 12 judicial precedent in the Second Cir-
9 130 CONG. REc. S8913 (daily ed. June 29, 1984) (statement of Sen. D'Amato) (emphasis
added).
10 See 130 CONG. REc. H7757 (daily ed. July 25, 1984) (statements of Reps. Broyhill and
Dingell).
I See id. at H7758 (statement of Rep. Dingell); Wang, supra note 7, at i i89-go (discussing
the legislative history of § 2o(d)). There was neither a Senate Banking Committee report nor a
House-Senate conference report on any of the Senate amendments to the Insider Trading
Sanctions Act, including § 2o(d). See 130 CONG. Rxc. H7758 (statement of Rep. Dingell).
12 The leading Supreme Court insider trading cases involving rule iob-5 are Chiarella v.
United States, 445 U.S. 222 (I98O), and Dirks v. SEC, 463 U.S. 646 (1983); neither was a
private civil action for damages. As I read Chiarella, the Court is suggesting that an implied
rule iob-5 cause of action under the "special relationship" theory exists but that the only private
party who can sue an insider trader on this ground is the party on the other side of the trade.
See Wang, supra note 5, at 1270-71. Identifying the party in privity with a stock market
insider trader is not as difficult as many commentators believe. See Wang, supra note 7, at
1179 n.20.
Harvey Pitt's analysis of Chiarella is similar. See Pitt, After the Fall: The Ins and Outs of
Rule iob-5, in TWELFTH ANNUAL INSTITUTE ON SECURITIES REGULATION 643, 662-63 (A.
Fleischer, M. Lipton & R. Mundheim eds. 198o). Although Chiarella was a criminal case, the
Second Circuit has relied on it to deny standing to a class of private civil plaintiffs. See Moss
v. Morgan Stanley, Inc., 719 F.2d 5 (2d Cir. 1983), cert. denied sub nom. Moss v. Newman,
465 U.S. 1025 (1984); see also infra note 13 (discussing Moss).
Nevertheless, many commentators disagree with my conclusion that only the party in con-
tractual privily can bring a private iob-5 action against the stock market insider trader under
the "special relationship" theory. Professor Langevoort, for example, states:
It is possible to read Chiarella as saying that only the party in privity has standing to
sue.... But this is little more than inference drawn from dicta, probably not enough
to overcome the legitimate concern expressed in Shapiro that a privity requirement in
the context of open market insider trading would be foolishly formalistic ....
D. LANGEVOORT, INSIDER TRADING HANDBOOK 285-86 (1987); accord Note, Laventhall v.
General Dynamics Corporation: No Recovery for the Plaintiff-Option Holder in a Case of Insider
1058 [Vol. lOi=5O6
HeinOnline -- 101 Harv. L. Rev.  1058 1987-1988
A CAUSE OF ACTION FOR OPTION TRADERS
cuit, the most important circuit in securities litigation, supported Con-
gress' assumption that some stock traders could sue certain stock
market insider traders. 13 The intent of section 2o(d) was to allow
Trading Under Rule xob-5, 79 Nw. U.L. REV. 780, 792 n.72 (1984) ("The Court sought to limit
only the defendant class .. . and did not consider, even in passing, what group of investors
might comprise the plaintiff class ... ."). Several courts and commentators have concluded
that, despite Chiarella and Dirks, "contemporaneous" traders have a rule iob-5 cause of action
against a stock market insider trader liable under the "special relationship" theory. See, e.g.,
In re McDonnell Douglas Corp. Sec. Litig., 587 F. Supp. 625, 630 (E.D. Mo. 1983) (stating
that although Dirks reaffirmed the special relationship requirement, "Itihe Supreme Court did
not discuss or limit the application of the 'contemporaneous trading' rule"); SA A. JACOBS,
LITIGATION AND PRACTICE UNDER RULE IOB-5 § 66.o2[a][iii][D] (2d rev. ed. 1987). Ironically,
the Second Circuit has applied Chiarella to limit the class of plaintiffs who can sue "misappro-
priators," but not the class of plaintiffs who can sue an insider trader liable under the "special
relationship" theory endorsed in Chiarella. See infra note 13.
I may be wrong in concluding that under Chiarella only the party in contractual privity can
sue a stock market insider trader who breaches a rule iob-5 "special relationship." Even so,
the class of plaintiffs allowed to sue such a defendant should include at least the party on the
other side of the transaction. Such a plaintiff should have the right to rescind under section
29(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78cc (I982), which renders voidable
any contract made in violation of the Act or of any rule promulgated thereunder. See generally
Gruenbaum & Steinberg, Section 29 (b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934: A Viable Remedy
Awakened, 48 GEo. WASH. L. REv. 1 (i979).
13 In that Circuit, a stock market insider trader who violates rule iob-5 under the "special
relationship" theory becomes liable to "contemporaneous" traders. See Wilson v. Comtech
Telecommunications Corp., 648 F.2d 88, 94--95 (2d Cir. ig8i); see also Wang, supra note 5, at
1279-82 (discussing the Wilson case); Wang, supra note 7 (discussing the meaning of "contem-
poraneous"). Although decided after Chiarella, Wilson does not cite the Supreme Court's opin-
ion. District courts in the First and Eighth Circuits have endorsed Wilson's "contemporaneous"
plaintiff class. See, e.g., Abelson v. Strong, 644 F. Supp. 524 (D. Mass. I986); In re McDonnell
Douglas Corp. Sec. Litig., 587 F. Supp. 625, 630 (E.D. Mo. 1983) (citing dictum from Laventhall
v. General Dynamics Corp., 704 F.2d 407, 412 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 846 (1983)).
But cf. Fridrich v. Bradford, 542 F.2d 307 (6th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1053 (I977)
(attempting to outline what a private plaintiff suing a stock market insider trader under rule
iob-5 must demonstrate, but failing to explain clearly whether the essential element is privity
of contract, causation of harm by the insider's act of trading, either of the above, or both). See
generally Wang, supra note 5, at 1262-67, 1284, I316 (analyzing Fridrich).
The Second Circuit has since held that trading stock on material nonpublic information does
not make the defendant trader liable to "marketplace," or even "contemporaneous," traders, if
liability under rule iob-5 is based on the "misappropriation" theory. See Moss, 719 F.2d at o-
13, i5-16. See generally supra note 5. Moss at least limits the scope of Wilson's "contempor-
aneous trader" holding. One might argue that Moss raises doubts as to Wilson's continued
vitality. Moss does not refer to Wilson, however. Therefore, the appropriate interpretation of
Moss is that it implicitly limits the Wilson holding to defendants who breach a "special rela-
tionship."
The above discussion deals with rule iob-5. Under certain circumstances, rule 14e-3, 17
C.F.R. § 240. I4e-3 (1987), prohibits individuals from tipping or trading on the basis of material
information about an impending tender offer. One lower court, for example, has allowed a
private cause of action for "relief" (presumably damages) under rule 14e-3. See O'Connor &
Assoc. v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 529 F. Supp. 1179 (S.D.N.Y. i98i) (allowing plaintiff
options sellers to sue defendant options buyers); cf. Burlington Indus., Inc. v. Edelman, Fed.
Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 93,339 (4 th Cir. 1987), aff'g on the opinion below 666 F. Supp. 799
(M.D.N.C. 1987) (holding that a target company has standing to obtain a preliminary injunction
against possible rule 14e-3 violations). See generally D. LANGEVOORT, supra note 12, § 9.04.
,1988] 1059
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analogously situated option-trading plaintiffs an equivalent private
cause of action against insider traders of options. In short, the leg-
islative history of section 2o(d) clearly demonstrates that Congress
enacted the provision to remedy one of the problems discussed in the
Note. A private cause of action against insider traders of options is
now available to option-trading plaintiffs.
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